Do Women Ask for Less and Give-In More Than Men Do in Negotiations? A Lab-Based Study of Gender Gaps in Asking, Accommodating and Subsequent Outcomes

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Abstract

Using an interactive worker–employer salary negotiation for an incentivised laboratory job, this paper examines gender differences in negotiation behaviour and outcomes. Despite negotiating for the same position, women ask for less and display greater accommodative behaviour towards the counterpart. These strategies increase the likelihood of agreement but result in lower negotiated salaries. Conditional on initial asks, outcome differences largely disappear. The findings provide novel evidence on accommodation as a behavioural mechanism in negotiations and offer new insights into the origins of gender pay disparities in the labour market.

Keywords: Negotiation, Lab Experiment, Gender, Asking, Accommodating
JEL: M51, M52, J31, J16.

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1 Introduction

Despite significant convergence between women and men in educational choices, labour force participation, working hours, occupational patterns, and household responsibilities (Goldin, 2021, 2014), substantial gender disparities in labour market outcomes persist (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Even after controlling for a wide range of demographic and background characteristics, women earn significantly less than men, particularly at the top of the salary distribution (Bertrand et al., 2010; Albrecht et al., 2015).

One widely discussed mechanism, examined extensively in both economics and social psychology (Recalde and Vesterlund, 2023; Bertrand, 2011; Bowles, 2013; Mazei, 2015), suggests that gender gaps partly arise from differences in how men and women behave—or are treated—in negotiations. Since negotiations are a crucial component of employer–employee interactions, any gender gap in negotiation behaviour or outcomes could have a significant bearing on the overall gender pay gap. For instance, as many as 35–40 percent of workers report negotiating their pay (Hall and Krueger, 2012; Stevens and Whelan, 2019; Card et al., 2016). Negotiations also influence access to resources and tasks within the workplace and may even shape broader career trajectories, as outcomes in household negotiations (e.g., on parental leave or division of domestic work) can affect labour market engagement. Poor negotiation outcomes may therefore contribute to long-term economic gender inequalities. Understanding the origins and role of gender in negotiation is thus vital for designing effective policies to reduce gender differences in the labour market.

Although the literature on gender and negotiation is extensive, it lacks a unified understanding of when in the negotiation process gender gaps arise. Evidence from different contexts indicates that women are less likely than men to initiate negotiations (e.g., Exley et al., 2020; Bowles, 2013; Bohnet and Bowles, 2008; Small et al., 2007) and tend to ask for less (e.g., Dreber et al., 2022; Dittrich et al., 2014), though findings are mixed regarding the size and direction of these gaps and their sensitivity to contextual factors (Exley et al., 2020; Artz et al., 2018; Stevens and Whelan, 2019; Säve-Söderbergh, 2019).[1] The literature shows that negotiation outcomes are shaped by factors such as the level of ambiguity in the negotiation context (Bowles et al., 2005; Leibbrandt and List, 2015), the real or perceived costs of negotiating (e.g., fear of backlash or reputational damage) (Bowles et al., 2007; Tinsley et al., 2009; Amanatullah and Morris, 2010), or women's rational decision to opt out of negotiation altogether (Exley et al., 2020). Consequently, it remains difficult to draw firm conclusions about the mechanisms driving observed gender differences, particularly given the interactive and reactive nature of negotiation processes.

In this paper, we examine salary negotiations in which we observe the entire interaction from start to finish. We focus especially on within-game adjustments to identify whether gender gaps in negotiation outcomes can be explained by differences in asking behaviour and responsiveness to counterparts. We study two key behaviours: asking behaviour and accommodating behaviour. Asking is central to achieving desired outcomes—those who ask for less tend to receive less—and it shapes the bargaining range. However, asking alone may not suffice: if one readily concedes to counteroffers, initial asks may

[1] See also Leibbrandt and List (2015); Azmat and Petrongolo (2014); Card et al. (2016); Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018).

be rendered meaningless. Negotiation thus requires both assertiveness and accommodation. Even if men and women are asking similarly, differences in accommodation could produce gender gaps in final outcomes. We therefore analyse whether there is a gender gap in accommodation rates—specifically, in the willingness to yield to a counterpart's position.

To identify true gender gaps, men and women must negotiate under identical conditions. We therefore conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in which female and male participants negotiate over a salaried job, facing fixed stakes and conditions. The negotiation is repeated across several rounds with different counterparts. In essence, the negotiation has two parties who alternate offers and requests in order to negotiate a salary level for a job that is performed for the salary they agree on. salary. Workers perform the task for the negotiated salary, while employers earn the residual from a fixed profit if the negotiation is successful. Our main research questions are: (i) given a fixed and known profit to be shared, do men and women start by asking for the same amount? and (ii) when confronted with the same counteroffer, do men and women differ in their willingness to accommodate? We further test whether negotiation behaviour changes when the gender of the counterpart is salient. Participants alternate between same-sex and opposite-sex negotiations or a control condition where neither party knows the other's gender. This allows us to test whether gendered beliefs influence negotiation behaviour.

The experiment produces several key findings. Despite identical stakes and tasks, female participants negotiate lower pay than male participants. This difference stems from two behaviours: (1) female workers start by asking for less, on average, which narrows the negotiation range but increases the likelihood of reaching an agreement; and (2) female workers accommodate more, adjusting their initial ask to a greater degree than males. Both behaviours raise the probability of a successful negotiation—women are more likely to secure the job—but at a lower wage. There is no gender gap in the expected earnings from the negotiation behaviour, implying that while males ask for more, or accommodate less, they are also more likely to have their asks ultimately rejected, resulting in neither gains for the worker nor the employer. Still, the gender gaps in negotiation behaviours are small, suggesting that females do not lose much on their behaviour and like men, women advocate for higher pay than just an equal split with the employer. Finally, although anticipating that beliefs about the gender of the counterpart could shift negotiation behaviour, we find no evidence that the gender gap changes when the counterpart's gender is known. We do observe some weak evidence that both men and women adjust their behaviour in same-gender pairings: women negotiate more leniently with women, while men negotiate more aggressively with men. Overall, gender gaps in negotiation behaviour do not appear to be driven by anticipations of different reactions from male or female counterparts. All results are robust to controls for starting order effects, round effects, education, age, risk preferences, and attitudes toward negotiation.

Our findings provide new insights while also complementing previous literature on gender gaps in negotiations. First, we study gender gaps in negotiation behaviour and outcomes within a unified framework that captures interactive behaviour throughout the negotiation. Because men and women often occupy different jobs and labour market positions, estimating gender differences in negotiation is challenging in field data; our controlled setting ensures identical stakes and conditions along with interactive behaviour, which is seldom found in real-world data. Second, the negotiation is incentivised:

participants perform a real task for the wage they negotiate, bringing the experiment closer to real-world decision-making. Third, our finding that women ask for less complements previous evidence from both the laboratory and field studies (e.g., Rigdon, 2012; Cortés et al., 2024; Dreber et al., 2022; Säve-Söderbergh, 2019),[2] while also contributing with new evidence on accommodating behaviour within negotiations.

Our findings should, however, be interpreted with caution. First, the lab setting may limit external validity—participants might not perceive the job as fully "real," potentially affecting effort and engagement. Second, negotiations occurred between participants rather than real employers and employees, which may have reduced strategic aggressiveness or accommodation. Third, the design necessarily divides the sample by gender and role, reducing statistical power and the generalisability of results. Hence, while the findings offer valuable insights, their implications for broader labour market inequalities should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, Section 3 presents the data and empirical setup. Section 4 outlines the results. Finally, Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results and provide concluding remarks.

2 The Experiment

2.1 The Experimental Design of the Negotiation

We set up an interactive salary negotiation, a *demand ultimatum game*, for a real job done directly in the lab. The experiment is based on a similar design of the demand ultimatum game as in Rigdon (2012), but has been adjusted to be a negotiation for a real job that has to be performed by one of the players.[3] All participants are randomised into pairs in which one has the role of a worker who needs to do the work for the salary that the person negotiates. The other player in the pair has the role of an employer, claiming the residual gain, and being the player to accept the negotiation in order for the job to be done. In essence, players have to coordinate the splitting of a pie, where one has to do a job. If the worker and employer do not agree on a division of the profit gained by the job, they both gain zero. They will get what they negotiated only if the worker performs the 20-minute job in the lab and the employer stays and wait the same time. The instructions are available from the authors upon request.

The experiment is played in the following sequence: player A, the worker, asks for his or her share of a known and fixed pie worth 250 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs), equivalent to 25 euros, which will constitute his or her salary for doing the job if player A accepts the job, works 20 minutes in the lab, and player B, the employer, agrees to stay during that time. The protocol of the game is illustrated in Figure 1.

The employer can make a counter-offer, after seeing the worker's ask, indicating the salary he or she is willing to offer. The worker can then make another ask, after seeing the employer's counter-offer. Finally, the negotiation ends by the employer accepting or rejecting the worker's last ask. In case the

[2]See also recent literature on information frictions affecting negotiation behaviour and outcomes (Chotiputsilp and Kim, 2021; Fröberg et al., 2023; Roussille, 2024; Mas, 2017; Bennedsen et al., 2019).

[3]Other differences to the design by Rigdon (2012) is that players were not represented by any avatar, the game was played in one round only and players were assigned the roles in the negotiation from a ranking procedure based on a task performance. Moreover, the total endowment per pair was 20 US dollars in that paper, compared to 25 euros in our paper.

employer agrees to the ask, the employer receives 250 euros minus the salary and the worker receives the salary, but only after the worker has performed the job while the employer also waits in the lab. If the employer does not accept the ask, the negotiation breaks down and both will receive nothing. The job consists of performing non-performance-based experimental tasks for 20 minutes.

Figure 1: A graphic illustration of the negotiation protocol



NOTES: The figure illustrates the four stages of the game in which the player types alternate between asking and counter-offering.

The experiment builds on a forced negotiation protocol where each pair has to go through all four stages described below, and the only thing a participant can change in the protocol are the numbers. A more detailed description of the information provided in the negotiation protocol is as follows:

- **Stage 1**: the worker is asked to provide the salary he or she asks for out of the 250 ECUs by filling in the number: "I request X ECUs of the 250 ECUs".
- **Stage 2**: the employer then sees the worker's request and must provide his or her offer to the worker for doing the job by filling in the number Y: "I offer you Y ECUs out of the 250 ECUs".
- **Stage 3**: the worker then sees the offer Y from the employer and must send a second request by filling in the number Z: "I request Z ECUs of the 250 ECUs".
- **Stage 4**: the employer sees the second request (Z) and either accepts or rejects the final request by choosing "I accept" or "I reject".

Importantly, it is a forced protocol such that the negotiation has to be completed in these steps even if there is an early agreement. In case of early agreement, the worker and the employer simply fill in the same numbers when providing all four steps. The negotiation is repeated with new pairs for six rounds, and in every new round each participant plays against the opposite gender from the previous round. If a player in round 1 negotiates against a female, that player will face a male opponent in the next round, and so on. To avoid hedging possibilities between rounds, one round out of six is randomly

chosen for payment.

2.2 Salience of Gender

We also set up the experiment to test the impact of gender salience in negotiations by randomising participants to negotiate against a counterpart whose gender was salient or gender-neutral. There were two types of treatments, each applied to half of the sessions, either with counterparts of salient gender (gender-salient pairs) or non-salient counterparts (control-group pairs). We also randomise the players in the gender-salient sessions to either start the first round playing against the opposite sex or the same sex, in order to account for potential order effects. In the control condition, gender was not known, and all players started the first round in opposite-gender pairs. Recall that after the first round, each new counterpart is always of the opposite gender compared with the one they faced in the previous round.

2.2.1 The choice of avatars

In the instructions, before the players began the negotiation, they were told to choose an avatar to represent them. The choices are summarised in Figure 2. If they were playing in the gender-blind control condition, they were given the choice of 10 versions of smileys, each with the same appearance but in different colours. In that condition, they also had to choose a name based on the colour of the smiley, though it did not have to match the chosen colour. They were also instructed that if another player chose the same name, a number would be added to the name as well (e.g., Green2).

Figure 2: Gender Salience: the Choice of Avatars in the Experiment

(a) emoji faces **(b)** male faces **(c)** female faces



In the gender-salient condition, players were instead given the choice of avatars that corresponded to the gender they had indicated in a questionnaire provided at the beginning of the experiment. This questionnaire asked for the player's field of study, included several questions on language proficiency, and then asked for their gender. Although asking about gender before negotiating may introduce bias by potentially activating stereotype threats or similar effects, the question was necessary to enable gender representation in the negotiation and to assign avatars corresponding to the chosen gender. Similar to the smiley condition, the gendered avatar condition provided a choice among the 20 most common male or female names in Italy in 2023, depending on which gender had been chosen.[4]

[4]We also have a pre-fixed matching protocol for the lab stations such that women and men (based on their first name) are separately and randomly seated within a pre-fixed set of lab stations (there are 12 stations for males and 12 for females). With this seating procedure, we establish which stations will constitute the pairs that negotiate against each other (players always switch the gender of the counterpart in each round). Considering the low degree of freedom due to randomising a new counterpart in each round by gender, we included a pop-up question allowing participants to

3 Data and Empirical Set-up

3.1 Data

The experiment was implemented in the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social Science (BLESS) at UNIBO, with the instructions translated into Italian. All participants who completed the session, or were over-recruited to ensure a full session (an *overdraft*), were offered a show-up fee of 10 euros.

The experiment was run with 768 participants, divided into 32 sessions of 24 players. The first 24 sessions were performed in June 2023. For administrative reasons, the additional eight sessions required to attain the pre-registered number of sessions were run in January 2024. We therefore account for any potential timing effect by including a dummy for the time lapse between the two periods.

Our sample was split into 50 percent men and 50 percent women. In addition, half of the players negotiated as workers and half as employers. This means we have 384 workers and 384 employers, with 192 male and 192 female players in each group. Following our pre-analysis plan, we exclude outliers in our outcome variables by removing observations below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile in either asking behaviour or accommodating behaviour. The decision to exclude outliers was based on a pilot study. This reduces the sample to 178 male workers and 186 female workers. Since they all play in six rounds, the number of observations for male workers is 1,071 and for female workers 1,118. The data structure showing how the observations are divided by different player roles, experimental conditions, and gender is presented in Table A.1.

3.2 Behaviour and Outcome Measures

Using the design of an interactive negotiation, we can evaluate two behaviours that are relevant in a negotiation and that may differ by gender. The first behaviour is *asking behaviour*: the level of salary that players ask for (out of the 250 ECUs) to be willing to do the job. We then study how much the worker asks in Stage 1 (Ask 1) and Stage 3 (Ask 2). Among employers, we study the offer the employer made to the worker in Stage 2 (Offer), which is an unconditional offer. However, this is affected by what the worker asked for and is therefore conditional on the worker's ask.

The second behaviour is *accommodating behaviour*, that is, how much the player has adjusted his or her initial ask to the offer of the counterpart. We measure this as:

$$AccommodateA_{Worker} = \frac{Ask_{1,Worker} - Ask_{2,Worker}}{Ask_{1,Worker} - Offer_{1,Employer}}$$

This measure takes a value between 0 and 1. If it equals 1, the worker fully accommodates to the employer's offer, asking for the same amount as that offered by the employer. If it equals 0, there is no accommodation, as the worker makes no adjustment to the employer's offer. For the employer, accommodating behaviour is measured as:

$$Accommodate_{1,Employer} = \frac{Offer_{1,Employer}}{Ask_{1,Worker}}$$

re-answer the question on their gender, but only for those who had replied with a different gender than that expected by the pre-designed seating protocol (as given by their first name). When a participant changes his or her gender, a new set of pre-fixed gender avatars is displayed (male if male player and female if female player).

This measures the employer's accommodating behaviour in terms of the relative offer made. If the ratio equals 1, the counteroffer is identical to the worker's ask (indicating full accommodation by the employer). The further below 1 this ratio is, the less the employer has accommodated to the worker's ask.

We study several outcomes for both workers and employers. Among workers, we estimate how their negotiation behaviour was treated by employers by examining the offer to the worker in Stage 2 (*Offered*) and the worker's probability of having their ask accepted in Stage 4 (*Success*). For both employers and workers, we analyse expected earnings from the negotiation and conditional earnings from successful negotiations: *Job Pay* (for the worker) and *Residual* (for the employer).

3.3 Empirical set up

Along the lines of the pre-analysis plan, we had some priors on what gender gaps to test, summarised in Table A.2 and Table A.3 in Appendix A, for workers and employers, respectively. Apart from these pre-registered analyses, we include exploratory analyses. First, we study the outcomes of the negotiations to assess the effect of behaviour. Second, we provide descriptive analyses of the correlation between preferences and asking, and accommodating behaviour. We pre-registered that we expect more aggressive negotiation behaviours (asking for more and accommodating less) if a player likes to negotiate, has a better relative economic situation (stronger bargaining position), a higher reservation wage (greater bargaining power), or is more risk-taking. However, we deviate from the pre-analysis plan, as we do not use the survey-based reservation wage measure, since many participants provided non-credible answers and thus unreliable values.

All analyses are based on players' behaviours and outcomes across the repeated rounds and assess the mean behaviours and outcomes. We control for round effects, starting order in the first round, and a time effect due to the time lapse between some sessions (six months). Apart from this, we control for demographics (age, STEM enrolment) and player preferences, which are discussed at the end of the results section. Because behaviours across rounds can be affected by learning or history effects, we also report deviations from the first round, as these are free from such influences.

4 Results

Below, we report our results of analysing the game in two subsections: first studying gender gaps in negotiation behaviours (Section 4.1), and second studying gender gaps in subsequent negotiation outcomes (Section 4.2). Our main results are summarised in Table 1.

4.1 Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour

Stage 1. In the first stage of the negotiation, workers start by asking for a salary for doing the job. On average, to do the job, female workers asked for around 150 ECUs out of 250, while male workers asked for 159 ECUs. Consequently, there is a statistically significant raw gender gap in the first asked salary (Ask 1) of about 9 ECUs ($p < 0.001$), equivalent to female workers asking for 0.94 of what male workers ask when anticipating to do the same job. If we limit the analysis to the first round (thus

reducing any bias from learning or feedback over the rounds), the gender gap is similar but smaller, equivalent to 0.96, with weaker statistical significance ($p = 0.031$). There is, however, a large spread in both male and female asking behaviour, as shown in Figure A.1. Also, among both male and female workers, the lion's share starts the negotiation by asking for a salary larger than an equal split of the profit gained from their work (i.e., above 125 ECUs), with asks up to 200 ECUs.

Around 24 percent of female workers, and 18 percent of male workers, start negotiations by asking for exactly 125 ECUs—the egalitarian 50–50 split. This suggests that some workers seek to minimise negotiation by proposing an equal division that imposes no additional cost on the employer but also yields no surplus for themselves. Women are significantly more likely to adopt this "negotiation-avoidance" strategy than men ($p < 0.001$). When including asks close to 125 ECUs (120–130 ECUs), the gap widens: 35 percent of women versus 24 percent of men ($p < 0.001$). Conversely, men are more likely to begin with aggressive asks: 65 percent of men start above 150 ECUs, compared with 50 percent of women. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test confirms that the male and female ask distributions differ significantly ($p < 0.001$). Restricting the analysis to the first round yields similar patterns—66 percent of men versus 55 percent of women start aggressively ($p = 0.032$)—and women remain more likely to avoid negotiating (34 vs. 26 percent; $p = 0.0495$).

The gender gap in asks is also confirmed in our regression analyses (column 1, Panel A, Table 1). On average, accounting for game- and player-specific factors, female workers ask for 8.6 ECUs less than male workers do ($p < 0.001$) across the rounds. We also obtain a similar but smaller and weaker gender gap in asking when we limit the analysis to the first round only ($p = 0.058$); see Table A.4.

Stage 2. Turning to Stage 2 of the negotiation, the employer states his or her offer to the worker, after seeing the worker's ask. On average, employers offer 128 ECUs, substantially less than what workers asked for on average. Female employers offer approximately 130 ECUs out of 250, while male employers offer around 127 ECUs ($p < 0.001$).There is thus a gender gap in offers made by employers, but both male and female employers, on average, offer lower salaries than what the workers asked for (the mean ask was 158 ECUs). The gender gap in offers—6.2 ECUs ($p < 0.001$)—reported in column 2 of Table 1, is also robust to accounting for game- and player-specific factors. However, the gender gap is not robust when limiting the analysis to the first round (column 2, Table A.4).

Since the negotiation is interactive, the employer's offer depends on the worker's initial ask. We therefore define the "accommodation rate" as the ratio of the offer to the worker's first ask (labeled "Acc" in the table). A lower ratio indicates that the employer offers less relative to the worker's ask.

On average, male employers accommodate 83 percent of the worker's ask, while female employers accommodate 85 percent, revealing a small but statistically significant gender gap ($p = 0.001$). This difference remains robust to accounting for game and player characteristics (Panel A, column 3). Overall, female employers are slightly more likely to align their offers with the worker's initial ask, although the gender gap in accommodation is modest.

Stage 3. In Stage 3, the worker has the opportunity to make a new ask, Ask 2, after having seen the offer made by the employer. Figure 3 shows that, on average, both female and male workers adjust their first ask by asking for less in the second stage of the negotiation. Both male and female workers thus ask for more in the first stage as compared to the second stage. Nevertheless, although males also reduce their ask in the second stage, males' second-stage asks remain higher than females', and thus

Table 1: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviours, Outcomes and Conditional Outcomes at Different Stages of the Negotiation Game, All Rounds

	Panel A: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 3	Stage 4
	Worker	*Empl*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Ask 1	Offer	Acc	Ask 2	Acc	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-8.586***	6.191***	0.038***	-5.616***	0.053**	0.021
	(2.614)	(1.628)	(0.011)	(1.680)	(0.021)	(0.014)
R2	.052	.04	.024	.051	.017	.0064
Adj R2	.046	.034	.017	.045	.011	.00011
Obs.	1817	1915	1894	1895	1878	1915
	Panel B: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Job Pay
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.552	0.045**	1.863	1.227	-4.919***	-1.237
	(1.070)	(0.018)	(2.311)	(1.731)	(1.525)	(1.146)
R2	.0063	.013	.0059	.0082	.039	.011
Adj R2	.000018	.007	-.00033	.002	.032	.0042
Obs.	1915	1915	1915	1915	1706	1706
	Panel C: Gender Gaps in Conditional Negotiation Outcomes					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Job Pay
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.791	0.011	1.392	0.394	0.002	-1.258
	(1.020)	(0.015)	(2.184)	(1.464)	(0.820)	(0.783)
Ask 1	0.132***	-0.003***	-0.012	-0.698***	0.439***	-0.442***
	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.056)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.021)
R2	.033	.08	.0044	.29	.48	.48
Adj R2	.026	.073	-.0027	.28	.48	.48
Obs.	1817	1817	1817	1817	1648	1648
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Starting order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows gender gaps on behaviours and outcomes in the game from OLS regression results of workers' and employers' negotiation behaviour and outcomes in all stages of the game over all rounds. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Offered* is the salary that the worker was offered by the employer, *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

there is a gender gap in asking behaviour at this stage as well.

Figure 3: The Mean Ask 1 and Ask 2 of Workers in all Rounds of the Negotiation



On average, male workers ask for 143 ECUs in Stage 2, while female workers ask for 137 ECUs. There is thus a gender gap also in the second-stage asks (6 ECUs, $p < 0.001$), although this gap is smaller than for Ask 1 (9 ECUs, $p < 0.001$). Table 1, Panel A, column 4, shows that the gender gap in second asks is robust to controlling for game and player characteristics.

Nevertheless, the lower female asks in the second stage could reflect different adjustments to the offer made by the employer. We therefore assess the "accommodation rate" of male and female workers to the offer of the employer. These are derived as the relative change in the ask that the worker made from his or her initial ask as a response to the level offered.[5] On average, female workers reduce their initial ask by 13 ECUs between Stage 1 and Stage 3, while male workers reduce theirs by 17 ECUs ($p < 0.001$). Male workers thus adjust their ask to a larger extent in absolute terms, but this may be because they start at a higher level or were offered less compared with female workers. Plotting the distribution of workers' accommodation rates, we find that most adjust to the employer's offer. The most common accommodation rate is to fully align the ask with the employer's offer, Figure A.2. On average, there is a gender gap in the mean rate of accommodation: female workers accommodate their ask at a rate of 0.79 to the employer's offer, while male workers do so at a rate of 0.73—a statistically significant gender gap ($p < 0.001$). Fully accommodating the ask to the offer is the most common category among both male and female workers, but females are more likely to do so—62 percent versus 50 percent—a gender gap that is barely significant ($p = 0.071$).

That female workers accommodate their ask more to the employer's offer is also confirmed in our regression analysis; see Panel A, column 5, of Table 1. Across the rounds, female workers accommodate

[5]To provide an example: assume the first ask is 150 ECUs and the second is 135 ECUs, then the adjustment is 15 ECUs. Assume the employer offered the worker a salary of 125 ECUs. Then the employer wanted the worker to reduce his or her first ask by 25 ECUs. The accommodation rate we then derive is given by the ratio of 15 ECUs/25 ECUs=0.6. The worker thus adjusted his or her ask to 60 percent of what the employer suggested.

at a rate 5.3 percent higher to the employer's offer ($p < 0.001$) compared with male workers. The gender gap is also present when limiting the analysis to the first round, although its statistical significance is weaker ($p < 0.010$).

Stage 4. In the final stage of the game (Stage 4), the employer decides whether to accept the worker's last ask (Ask 2) or not. If the salary is accepted, the worker performs the job for the negotiated salary (Ask 2), and the employer earns the residual (250 ECUs − Ask 2). If the negotiation is not accepted, both the employer and the worker earn 0. On average, most negotiations ends with employers accepting the last ask. However, male employers are slightly less likely to accept the final ask than female employers (i.e., 0.90 vs. 0.88; $p = 0.03$). This gender gap in acceptance rates, however, is not robust to including all controls ($p = 0.141$); see Panel A, column 6, in Table 1, nor when we consider only the first round ($p = 0.173$); see Table A.4.

4.1.1 Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes in the Game

Starting with the negotiation outcomes of the workers, we first assess whether there is a gender gap in what workers are offered in Stage 2. On average, we find no gender gap among workers in the levels offered by employers (column 1, Panel B, Table 1). However, female workers are more successful, as their final asks are more often accepted by employers in Stage 4 (column 2, Panel B, Table 1). Female workers are more successful than men in attaining the job. When assessing the expected earnings from the negotiation, female and male workers earn similar amounts: 122 ECUs and 124 ECUs ($p = 0.234$), a pattern also confirmed in our regression framework (columns 3 and 4, Panel B, Table 1). Among the successful workers, that is, those whose final ask was accepted, female workers earn 135 ECUs, while male workers earn 141 ECUs for doing the same job ($p < 0.001$). Thus, women earn less than men from their negotiations among successful cases. The gender gap in Job Pay is also similar when we limit the analysis to the first round, with job pays of 136 ECUs and 142 ECUs, respectively ($p = 0.024$), and is confirmed in the regression framework ($p < 0.042$) (Panel B, column 5, Table A.4).

Panel C reports negotiation outcomes conditional on the worker's initial ask. Controlling for gender differences in asking, we find no gender gaps in negotiation success (Panel C, column 2, Table 1) or in final pay (Panel C, column 5). That is, female workers are not more likely to have their asks accepted once their generally lower initial requests are accounted for. The lower job pay that women attain stems entirely from asking less at the start, since lower asks are more likely to be accepted.[6]

4.2 Knowing the Gender of the Counterpart: Gender-Salient or Gender-Neutral Contexts

This section examines whether gender gaps in negotiation arise from expectations of differential treatment or reactions to counterpart gender, using sessions randomly assigned to either a gender-blind (smiley) or gender-salient (gendered avatar) context.

Starting by assessing the gender gaps in negotiation behaviour, we find only small or no differences between the gender-blind and gender-salient conditions (see Table A.7 and Table A.6). The gender

[6]Female workers are somewhat more likely to start at 125 ECUs, though the gap is not consistently significant ($p = 0.09$).

gaps in behaviours among workers and employers are essentially the same in both contexts.

To illustrate the gender gaps in asking behaviour, Figure A.3 shows the mean first asks of workers across the rounds, divided by whether workers negotiated against a gender-salient employer or a gender-blind smiley. Across the rounds, there is a consistent gender gap in asks regardless of salience. Yet, we also see some suggestive evidence of females being more sensitive to same-gender salience. That is, there is a persistent starting-order effect among females, whereby those who were randomly assigned a salient female employer in the first round ask for less across the rounds. Among males, we do not find a similar pattern.

Turning to accommodating behaviour, the gender gaps are similar regardless of gender salience. There is only a small difference: female employers are more willing to accept the ask compared with men when they do not know the gender of the counterpart, but this gender gap disappears when gender is known. This provides some suggestive evidence that employers negotiate more aggressively when they know the counterpart's gender.

Negotiation outcomes are also similar across the gender-salience conditions. Yet suggestively, workers appear to face a more aggressive negotiation tactic if their gender is known. Although male and female workers are not offered different salaries, female workers' asks are less often accepted in games when their gender is known. Female players' outcomes appear better when their gender is not salient (asks more often accepted and expected earnings higher), although the difference is not statistically significant ($p = 0.091$). Still, among successful negotiations, females attain lower pay for the job regardless of gender salience. When accounting for the gender gap in asks, female workers' asks are more often accepted when facing a smiley, regardless of the level of the ask, leading to higher expected earnings when their gender is unknown.

We have also tested other models to compare whether negotiation behaviours and outcomes vary by gender salience.[7] First, Table A.9 shows regression analyses using dummy variables for workers facing a salient male or salient female employer, compared with a smiley.[8]

Second, our experimental design allows us to test whether behaviour changes as a result of changing the gender of the counterpart, using fixed-effects regressions. Using the gender-salient condition only, we can exploit the switching design of the negotiation game—where workers alternate between counterparts of the opposite gender in every other round—to estimate a causal effect of the counterpart's gender. The fixed-effects regression results are reported in Table A.14 and Table A.15 for females and males, respectively. Neither male nor female workers change their asking behaviour significantly when switching from a female employer to a male employer. However, when assessing the second ask, there is weak suggestive evidence of female workers decreasing their ask more when facing a male employer than when facing a female employer ($p = 0.121$). On the other hand, both male and female workers

[7]Tables A.11 and A.12 show equivalent estimates from regressions on negotiation outcomes, indicating that females are more likely to get their second ask accepted. However, since females ask for less, conditional earnings and job salaries are lower among female workers.

[8]We have also conducted additional analyses focusing solely on the gender-salient sessions. We find an effect on asking behaviour among female players: although females consistently start negotiations by asking for less than males meeting male employers (the omitted category), females particularly ask for less from a male employer than from a female employer. In their second ask, however, the ask is lower against a female employer. None of these differences by counterpart gender is statistically significant. Females also accommodate more when the counterpart is female (Table A.13). Male workers, on the other hand, earn more from the job when facing a female employer.

are less willing to accommodate their ask to a male employer's offer (though not at a rate that differs by gender) compared with a female employer's offer. When facing a male employer, male workers seem to be less likely to have their final ask accepted ($p = 0.122$) compared with females. Finally, both expected and conditional earnings are lower with a male employer; still, among successful negotiations, earnings are lower only for males meeting a male employer, not for females meeting a male employer. Thus, there is some suggestive evidence of a same-gender effect in negotiations, where females are more lenient towards females and males are less lenient towards males.

In all, while most gender gaps arise regardless of whom the workers meet, we find some evidence of same-gender contexts operating differently from mixed-gender pairs. In particular, in male-to-male pairs, male workers lose in the negotiation, as their final ask has a lower probability of being accepted (although not statistically significant, $p = 0.124$), thereby lowering expected earnings (Table A.15). In successful negotiations, male workers in same-gender pairs end up working for lower pay than males facing female employers. Among female pairs, there is only one statistically significant effect from facing a same-gender employer—on accommodation rates (Table A.14). Suggestively, female workers ask for less (although not statistically significant, $p = 0.15$) when negotiating against females and are more accommodating than when negotiating with male employers.

4.3 Mechanisms

One frequently proposed explanation for women's lower initial asks in negotiations is gender differences in risk preferences. Using incentivised lottery choices, we test whether risk attitudes—and other individual characteristics—help explain negotiation behaviour (Tables A.17 and A.16). We also include other relevant characteristics that have been targets for explaining the gender gap in negotiation behaviour in the literature. These are differences in experience, math knowledge, outside options, and whether a person likes to negotiate or not. Alongside risk preferences, we include proxies for experience (age), math ability (STEM enrolment), outside options (self-assessed relative economic position), and a preference for negotiation ("Do you like to negotiate?", rated 1–10).

Among female workers, two factors are strongly associated with more aggressive negotiation behaviour: greater risk tolerance and stronger math ability. Women who are more willing to take risks or who study in STEM fields ask for higher amounts and accommodate less than others. Among male workers, the key predictor of assertive behaviour is "liking to negotiate", while better math ability is linked to less aggressive behaviour. Similar to the above, we find a starting order effect particularly among male players; those males that were randomly assigned to play against a female in the first round, have on average a more lenient negotiation behaviour across the rounds, in column 3. We also see, as previously shown, tendencies for same-gender negotiations to be more aggressive, as male employers are less likely to accept a salient male worker's offer compared with a smiley ($p = 0.138$), accommodate more to a female worker ($p = 0.167$), and tend to have a negative (positive) starting-order effect on their behaviour if they first negotiated with a male (female) (columns 4–5).

Among female players, we also see that female employers are more lenient towards a female worker ($p = 0.123$), and to some extent also among female workers themselves ($p = 0.18$).[9]

[9]Along the lines of our pre-analysis plan, we have also tested how the gender gap changes when these factors are controlled for. We find only a limited role for risk preferences and preferences in explaining the gender gaps in asking and

5 Discussion

Men and women commonly sort into different professions, positions, and forms of labour market attachment. Estimating gender differences in negotiation outcomes is therefore challenging, as the stakes and contexts they face often differ. Behavioural data from real negotiations are also rare, making it difficult to determine whether gender gaps arise because women ask for less, are treated differently despite similar behaviour, or both. Our experiment was designed to observe complete, incentivised negotiations in a setting where men and women faced identical stakes. Using randomised avatars—either gender-neutral or gendered—we also tested whether beliefs about a counterpart's gender influence behaviour while minimising other visual cues.

The results reveal several consistent gender differences. First, women begin negotiations by asking for less than men, even though the protocol allows later revisions. Men's higher initial asks expand the negotiation range and are associated with higher final pay. However, the gap in initial asks is modest, suggesting limited economic loss from this behaviour. Both genders typically ask for more than an equal split, showing that women also pursue advantageous outcomes rather than settling immediately for equality. Second, women—both as workers and employers—accommodate more to their counterpart's preferences. When learning what the other party wants, they reduce their own asks and thus their potential gains more than men do. This pattern appears independent of gender salience, implying that it reflects a general behavioural difference rather than a response to perceived counterpart gender. Third, among successful negotiations, women earn less because their lower asks and higher accommodation rates yield smaller pay-offs, even though they are more likely to reach an agreement. These results remain robust after controlling for age, education, risk preferences, and attitudes toward negotiation. Finally, we find no strong evidence that beliefs or differential treatment drive these gaps when gendered avatars are used. We observe only weak and suggestive evidence that gender salience matters for negotiation behaviour. In particular, within same-gender pairs, men tend to negotiate more aggressively with male counterparts, while women behave somewhat more leniently toward female counterparts compared with when negotiating against gender-neutral avatars.

Our results complement and extend previous research on asking behaviour. In the study most comparable to ours, Rigdon (2012) used a similar demand-ultimatum game and found that women also asked for less than men. In Rigdon's experiment, men requested USD 13 while women asked for USD 9 out of USD 20—a larger relative gap than in our study, where women's initial asks were approximately 94 percent of men's. Moreover, while women in Rigdon's study typically asked for less than an equal split, women in our experiment displayed more assertive behaviour, starting at 142 ECUs out of 250 ECUs. In both studies, women ended up earning less, although for different reasons. Direct comparison is difficult, however, as Rigdon's design was a one-shot, non-interactive game without a real-effort component.

Our finding that women accommodate more than men during negotiations appears to be novel. It suggests that part of the gender pay gap may stem from women's greater willingness to adapt to an employer's position—particularly if employers have incentives to minimise wages.

accommodating behaviour, as the gender gap only changes slightly in all models when adding these controls; see Table A.18.

Previous research has shown that access to salary information can reduce gender gaps in both requested and offered wages (see, e.g., Roussille, 2024; Rigdon, 2012; Fröberg et al., 2023; Mas, 2017). In our experiment, although participants were not informed about others' asks, they received information about their counterpart's preferences. This information affected women's behaviour more strongly than men's, as women adjusted their requests more to align with the counterpart's position. A valuable extension would be to test whether providing information about other participants' negotiation outcomes further influences behaviour.

As negotiation context has been shown to matter for gender gaps, our study examined whether behaviour differed between gender-salient and gender-neutral settings. Using avatars to signal gender, we find only weak evidence of systematic differences. Several factors could explain this. When gendered avatars are used, both the participant's and the counterpart's gender become salient, which may dilute the treatment effect: participants could adjust their behaviour in response to being perceived themselves, rather than solely to the counterpart's gender. Moreover, as participants followed a fixed negotiation protocol, we cannot observe whether some would have preferred to opt out of negotiations, as found in Exley et al. (2020).

This finding aligns with results in Cortés et al. (2024), who document a clear gender difference in job-offer acceptance timing, with women accepting offers substantially earlier than men. Similarly, we find that women ask for less initially and accommodate more, increasing the likelihood of acceptance but resulting in lower pay. Cortés et al. (2024) attribute such behaviour partly to gender differences in over-optimism about future offers, which we cannot test in our design but which would be a valuable extension—particularly in exploring how expectations evolve across negotiation rounds. While overconfidence among men, on average, resulted in a larger gender earnings gap in favour of men, this rise in earnings came at a cost as men were less likely to be satisfied with the job search process and reported more search regrets than women.

This could potentially be related to our study showing a larger breakdown rates of the negotiation among men. Yet, as we cannot say anything about how satisfied participants were with their negotiation practices, this is something that future research could examine.

Finally, we show that negotiation outcomes are higher when the starting ask is higher, both for male and female workers. Similarly, a higher accommodation rate is associated with lower negotiation outcomes, robust even after accounting for the starting ask. Hence, the pattern of negotiation shows that women end up working for less, explained by asking for less at the start and, to a smaller extent, by accommodating more. This could suggest that policies encouraging women to ask for more could be effective. Still, these findings stem from a forced protocol in a laboratory setting for a job with relatively low earnings; therefore, their broader applicability should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.

6 Concluding Remarks

Using a pre-registered design, our experiment studies whether women and men ask for the same salary for performing a job and whether they respond similarly to a counterpart's request, exploiting a negotiation over a salaried job conducted in the laboratory and repeated with different counterparts over several rounds. We find two main results: women consistently ask for less and accommodate more

to the counterpart's position in the negotiation. This provides new evidence of possible roots of gender gaps observed in both pay and, to some extent, career progression in the labour market. If women negotiate by asking for less and giving in more, we can expect to see gender gaps in outcomes.

Whereas women asking for less and giving-in more in negotiations are expected results, we find unexpected same-gender pair effects on behaviour. Although the evidence is weak, we show indications that male pairs negotiate more aggressively towards each other, while female pairs negotiate more leniently towards each other.

Nevertheless, several limitations of the experiment may have influenced these findings. First, the pairing and role assignments—where one player had to perform a job while the other did not—may have been too artificial for participants to care about who actually performed the task. If the job was not perceived as sufficiently demanding, the worker may not have wished to request a higher salary for the required effort. This could have made the negotiation scope feel narrower and led female pairs to revert to an egalitarian split more quickly than if the task had required greater effort. Second, we do not know whether, or how, participants were influenced by altruistic motivations. The offers of an egalitarian split made directly at Stage 1 suggest that some participants may have been influenced by altruism. Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research would be to incorporate measures of altruism and to test negotiation behaviour for a job that requires greater effort or carries a higher value. For the gender-salience condition, the results are based solely on simple gendered avatars. It is possible that these were not sufficient to trigger strong effects in negotiations. Therefore, future research should also explore other forms of gender representation. Finally, the experiment suffers from low statistical power, as participants were divided not only by role in the negotiation but also by gender and the gender of their counterpart, limiting the reach of the results. In addition, the results were obtained in a laboratory rather than in the real labour market. Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research would be to extend the experiment to a larger, real-world setting, such as an online labour market like MTurk or Prolific.

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APPENDICES

A TABLES & FIGURES APPENDIX

Table A.1: Data Structure by Gender and by Gender Salience

	Total	Male	Female
Number of players			
Workers	384	192	192
Employers	384	192	192
Without Outliers			
Workers	364	178	186
Employers	384	190	189
Number of observations			
Workers	2189	1071	1118
Employers	2276	1140	1136
Observations by Gender Salience			
Gender-neutral Smiley Context			
Workers	1092	532	560
Employers	1141	571	570
Gender-avatar Context			
Workers with Female Avatar in R1	560	272	288
Employers with Female Avatar in R1	574	288	286
Workers with Male Avatar in R1	537	267	270
Employers with Male Avatar in R1	561	281	280

NOTES: The table shows the number of players and observation for players in all six rounds divided by player gender and by gender salience.

Table A.2: Pre-reigstered Hypotheses of Workers

Type of test	Outcome	Compare	Expectation	Confirmed
Asking behaviour				
Primary test 1	$Ask_{1,PA}$	by gender	Females ask for less than males do	Yes
Secondary test 1	$Ask_{1,PA}$=125	by gender	Females are more likely to ask for an equal division than males	Yes
Secondary test 2	Distribution $Ask_{1,PA}$ differ	by gender	The female and male ask distributions differ	Yes
Primary test 2	$Ask_{1,PA}$	by gender salience	The gender gap in asks is larger with gender salience	No
Primary test 3	$Ask_{1,PA}$	by gender salience and counterpart gender	Both men and women ask more from their own gender (stereotype/easier to be tough on own gender/social cost)	No
Secondary test 3	$Ask_{1,PA}$=125	by gender	Both gender are less likely to ask an equal division from the same gender	No
Accommodating behaviour of workers				
Primary test 4	$AccA_{1,PA}$	by gender	Females accommodate more than males do	Yes
Primary test 5	$AccA_{1,PA}$	by gender salience and counterpart gender	Both men and women accommodate less to their own gender (stereotype/easier to be tough on own gender/social cost)	No
Secondary test 4	$AccA_{1,PA}$	by gender salience and counterpart gender	Facing a salient male opponent, females accommodate more compared to males	No

NOTES: The table shows our pre-registered hypotheses and whether they are confirmed or not.

Table A.3: Pre-reigstered Hypotheses for Employers

Type of test	Outcome	Compare	Expectation	Confirmed
Accommodating behaviour of Employers				
Primary test 1	$Acc_{1,PB}$	by gender	Women accommodate more than males do	Yes
Secondary test 1	$Acc_{1,PB}$ distributions differ	by gender	The distributions of accommodating behaviour differ	Yes
Secondary test 2	$Acc_{1,PB}$ =1	by gender	Females are more likely to fully accommodate to Player As ask compared to men	No
Primary test 2	$Acc_{1,PB}$	by gender salience	The gender gap in accommodating behaviour is larger with gender salience	No
Secondary test 3	$Acc_{1,PB}$	by gender composition	Both gender accommodate less to their own gender (stereotype/easier to be tough on own gender/social cost)	No
Primary test 3	$Accept_{2,PB} = 1$	by gender	Females more often accept the negotiation than males do	Yes
Secondary test 4	$Accept_{2,PB} = 1$	by gender composition	Both genders less often accept the negotiation if playing against their own gender	No
Primary test 4	$Acc_{1,PB}$	by gender salience	The gender gap in accepting behaviour is larger with gender salience	No
Primary test 5	$Adj.Accept_{2,PB} = Offer_{2,PB} * (Offer_{1,PB} - Ask_{2,PA})(-1)$	by gender	Females accept a larger relative loss than males do	Not tested
Primary test 6	$Adj.Accept_{2,PB} = Offer_{2,PB} * (Offer_{1,PB} - Ask_{2,PA})(-1)$	by gender	Both accept larger losses if facing a same gender counterpart	Not tested
Secondary test 5	$TotalEarnings$	by gender	Females earn less than males do	No

NOTES: The table shows our pre-registered hypotheses and whether they are confirmed or not.

A.1 Workers

Figure A.1: The Distribution of Workers' Asks in the First Stage of the Negotiation



Figure A.2: The Distribution of Workers' Accommodation Rates



Figure A.3: The Mean Levels of Ask 1 across the Rounds



Figure A.4: The Mean Levels of Accommodation of Workers Across the Rounds



A.2 Employers

Figure A.5: The Mean Levels of Employers Accommodation in Stage 2 Across the Rounds



Table A.4: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviours, Outcomes and Conditional Outcomes in Round 1 of Players at Different Stages of the Negotiation

	Panel A: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 3	Stage 4
	Worker	*Empl*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Ask 1	Offer	Acc	Ask 2	Acc	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-5.638*	-0.215	0.013	-4.290*	0.061**	0.049
	(2.960)	(2.352)	(0.016)	(2.243)	(0.030)	(0.033)
R2	.033	.016	.037	.032	.045	.012
Adj R2	.011	-.0048	.017	.011	.024	-.0087
Obs.	366	383	382	379	374	383
	Panel B: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.415	0.022	-1.263	2.312	-4.992**	-3.486
	(2.230)	(0.032)	(4.875)	(4.245)	(2.285)	(2.387)
R2	.007	.037	.025	.01	.025	.038
Adj R2	-.014	.016	.0037	-.011	.0016	.015
Obs.	383	383	383	383	340	339
	Panel C: Gender Gaps in Conditional Negotiation Outcomes					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	1.306	-0.004	-1.834	0.449	-0.842	-3.048*
	(1.985)	(0.031)	(4.864)	(3.424)	(1.646)	(1.680)
Ask 1	0.297***	-0.003***	0.029	-0.813***	0.519***	-0.521***
	(0.046)	(0.001)	(0.108)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.045)
R2	.18	.11	.023	.35	.5	.51
Adj R2	.16	.084	-.002	.33	.48	.49
Obs.	366	366	366	367	329	329
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Starting order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows gender gaps on behaviours and outcomes in the game from ols regression results of workers' and employers' negotiation behaviour and outcomes in all stages of the game in round 1. Only Players that played in a Smiley Context. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Offered* is the salary that the worker was offered by the employer, *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.5: Gender Gaps in Behaviours, Outcomes and Conditional Outcomes for Players that Negotiated in a *Smiley (Gender-neutral) Context* at Different Stages of the Negotiation, All Rounds

	Panel A: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour, Smileys					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 3	Stage 4
	Worker	*Empl*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Ask 1	Offer	Acc	Ask 2	Acc	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-8.398**	6.041***	0.045***	-5.511**	0.054*	0.034*
	(3.737)	(2.211)	(0.016)	(2.536)	(0.030)	(0.019)
R2	.082	.062	.041	.053	.036	.0085
Adj R2	.071	.051	.03	.042	.024	-.003
Obs.	904	960	949	941	936	960
	Panel B: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes, Smileys					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.569	0.067**	5.036	3.790	-4.740**	-0.019
	(1.560)	(0.026)	(3.358)	(2.402)	(2.313)	(1.610)
R2	.011	.028	.015	.0096	.045	.023
Adj R2	-.00066	.017	.0038	-.0019	.033	.011
Obs.	955	955	955	960	847	852
	Panel C: Gender Gaps in Conditional Negotiation Outcomes, Smileys					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	1.461	0.035**	5.445**	1.540	0.117	-1.074
	(1.480)	(0.018)	(2.751)	(1.876)	(1.263)	(1.033)
Ask 1	0.175***	-0.003***	0.061	-0.725***	0.483***	-0.485***
	(0.051)	(0.000)	(0.079)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.031)
R2	.055	.092	.016	.33	.55	.55
Adj R2	.042	.08	.0027	.32	.54	.54
Obs.	904	904	904	909	822	827
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Starting order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows gender gaps on behaviours and outcomes in the game from ols regression results of workers' and employers' negotiation behaviour and outcomes in all stages of the game. Only players that played in a Smiley Context are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Offered* is the salary that the worker was offered by the employer, *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.6: Gender Gaps in Behaviours, Outcomes and Conditional Outcomes for Players that Negotiated with Avatars (Gendered) Context at Different Stages of the Negotiation, All Rounds

	Panel A: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour, Avatars					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 3	Stage 4
	Worker	*Empl*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Ask 1	Offer	Acc	Ask 2	Acc	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-9.393**	5.991**	0.029*	-6.053***	0.059**	0.006
	(3.632)	(2.397)	(0.016)	(2.178)	(0.027)	(0.021)
R2	.047	.041	.027	.055	.034	.011
Adj R2	.034	.028	.014	.043	.022	-.002
Obs.	913	955	945	954	942	955
	Panel B: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes, Avatars					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.201	0.030	-0.715	-1.337	-5.371***	-2.314
	(1.509)	(0.024)	(3.086)	(2.520)	(1.954)	(1.695)
R2	.01	.012	.011	.01	.047	.0097
Adj R2	-.0024	-.000033	-.0017	-.0025	.034	-.0044
Obs.	960	960	960	955	859	854
	Panel C: Gender Gaps in Conditional Negotiation Outcomes, Avatars					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.508	-0.008	-2.049	-1.113	-0.454	-1.366
	(1.441)	(0.022)	(3.218)	(2.286)	(1.043)	(1.207)
Ask 1	0.096***	-0.003***	-0.083	-0.674***	0.390***	-0.392***
	(0.027)	(0.001)	(0.074)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.022)
R2	.024	.088	.013	.25	.41	.41
Adj R2	.01	.075	-.0014	.24	.4	.4
Obs.	913	913	913	908	826	821
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Starting order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows gender gaps on behaviours and outcomes in the game from ols regression results of workers' and employers' negotiation behaviour and outcomes in all stages of the game in round 1. Only Players that played in a Gendered-Avatar Context are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Offered* is the salary that the worker was offered by the employer, *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.7: Gender Gaps in Behaviours, Outcomes and Conditional Outcomes in Round 1 for Players that Negotiated in a Smiley (Gender-neutral) Context at Different Stages of the Negotiation

	Panel A: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour, Smileys					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 3	Stage 4
	Worker	*Empl*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Ask 1	Offer	Acc	Ask 2	Acc	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-1.636	0.855	-0.017	-5.361	0.032	-0.039
	(4.298)	(3.352)	(0.024)	(3.329)	(0.044)	(0.050)
R2	.039	.0088	.036	.038	.024	.037
Adj R2	.00054	-.029	-.00019	.00039	-.014	-.00015
Obs.	182	192	192	189	186	192
	Panel B: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes, Smileys					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.945	0.048	1.477	-9.989	-6.119*	-6.591*
	(3.206)	(0.049)	(7.621)	(6.320)	(3.509)	(3.703)
R2	.013	.019	.012	.034	.029	.033
Adj R2	-.025	-.018	-.026	-.0031	-.014	-.0098
Obs.	191	191	191	192	168	168
	Panel C: Gender Gaps in Conditional Negotiation Outcomes, Smileys					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-1.107	0.023	-0.730	-6.177	-4.343*	-3.759
	(2.947)	(0.047)	(7.617)	(5.275)	(2.423)	(2.294)
Ask 1	0.347***	-0.003***	0.019	-0.872***	0.568***	-0.589***
	(0.065)	(0.001)	(0.166)	(0.089)	(0.062)	(0.056)
R2	.22	.11	.017	.39	.55	.58
Adj R2	.18	.064	-.028	.36	.53	.56
Obs.	182	182	182	183	161	161
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows gender gaps on behaviours and outcomes in the game from ols regression results of workers' and employers' negotiation behaviour and outcomes in all stages of the game in round 1. Only Players that played in a Smiley Context. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Offered* is the salary that the worker was offered by the employer, *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.8: Gender Gaps in Behaviours, Outcomes and Conditional Outcomes for Players that Negotiated in a Gender Salient (Gendered Avatars) Context at Different Stages of the Negotiation, Round 1

	Panel A: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Behaviour, Avatars					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 3	Stage 4
	Worker	*Empl*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Ask 1	Offer	Acc	Ask 2	Acc	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-10.680***	-1.885	0.043*	-3.837	0.096**	0.141***
	(4.082)	(3.292)	(0.023)	(3.083)	(0.042)	(0.043)
R2	.059	.042	.061	.04	.06	.082
Adj R2	.022	.0056	.025	.0031	.024	.046
Obs.	184	191	190	190	188	191
	Panel B: Gender Gaps in Negotiation Outcomes, Avatars					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.102	0.005	-3.115	15.550***	-4.243	0.099
	(3.158)	(0.042)	(6.348)	(5.577)	(2.976)	(3.088)
R2	.0096	.038	.028	.089	.026	.057
Adj R2	-.028	.0018	-.0085	.055	-.016	.017
Obs.	192	192	192	191	172	171
	Panel C: Gender Gaps in Conditional Negotiation Outcomes, Avatars					
	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	End	Job	Job
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Worker*	*Empl*
	Offered	Success	Exp Earn	Exp Earn	Job Pay	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	3.980	-0.029	-2.713	8.138*	2.039	-1.527
	(2.644)	(0.041)	(6.381)	(4.484)	(2.094)	(2.430)
Ask 1	0.260***	-0.003***	0.019	-0.717***	0.486***	-0.462***
	(0.066)	(0.001)	(0.153)	(0.098)	(0.068)	(0.067)
R2	.16	.097	.013	.35	.47	.47
Adj R2	.13	.055	-.033	.32	.44	.44
Obs.	184	184	184	184	168	168
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows gender gaps on behaviours and outcomes in the game from OLS regression results of workers' and employers' negotiation behaviour and outcomes in all stages of the game in round 1. Only Players that played in a Gendered-Avatar Context are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Offered* is the salary that the worker was offered by the employer, *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.9: Gender Gaps in Behaviour by Gender Salience in the Negotiation: Workers Negotiating in either a Gender-Neutral Session (Smiley) or a Gender Salient Session (Male or Female Avatars), All Rounds

	Workers Negotiation Behaviour and Gender Salience Across Rounds					
	(1) Ask 1	(2) Ask 1	(3) Ask 2	(4) Ask 2	(5) Accom	(6) Accom
Female	-8.338***	-8.110**	-5.632***	-5.745**	0.055***	0.068**
	(2.626)	(3.741)	(1.677)	(2.479)	(0.020)	(0.030)
Salient Female Emp	0.721	0.556	-0.710	-0.485	0.038	0.041
	(3.223)	(4.210)	(1.999)	(2.663)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Salient Male Emp	0.126	0.749	-0.726	-1.182	-0.009	0.013
	(3.270)	(4.214)	(2.086)	(2.755)	(0.027)	(0.037)
Sal Fem Round 1	-4.143	-4.146	-3.660*	-3.650*	0.018	0.018
	(3.674)	(3.674)	(2.169)	(2.171)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Fem x Sal Male Emp		-1.221		0.898		-0.043
		(5.277)		(3.369)		(0.044)
Fem x Sal Fem Emp		0.325		-0.458		-0.006
		(5.259)		(3.341)		(0.043)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.049	.049	.051	.051	.017	.018
Adj R2	.044	.043	.046	.045	.011	.011
Obs.	1817	1817	1895	1895	1878	1878

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows the ols regression results of workers behaviours in the negotiation over the rounds in sessions with smileys or gendered avatars (a salient female or female employer). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Accom* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted.

Table A.10: Gender Gaps by Gender Salience in the Negotiation in Round 1: Behaviours of Workers Negotiating in a Gender-Neutral (Smiley) or Gender Salient (Male or Female Avatars) Session

	Workers Negotiation Behaviour and Gender Salience in Round 1					
	(1) Ask 1	(2) Ask 1	(3) Ask 2	(4) Ask 2	(5) Accom	(6) Accom
Female	-5.457*	-1.156	-4.251*	-4.985	0.060**	0.034
	(2.950)	(4.280)	(2.263)	(3.353)	(0.030)	(0.044)
Salient Female Emp	-4.300	3.317	-2.985	-2.504	0.077**	0.067
	(3.710)	(5.220)	(2.716)	(4.025)	(0.034)	(0.049)
Salient Male Emp	-2.009	-1.064	0.645	-1.274	-0.038	-0.081
	(3.614)	(5.041)	(2.858)	(4.113)	(0.038)	(0.059)
Fem x Sal Male Emp		-1.913		3.865		0.087
		(7.103)		(5.694)		(0.076)
Fem x Sal Fem Emp		-15.079**		-0.953		0.019
		(7.368)		(5.474)		(0.067)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.032	.044	.032	.034	.048	.051
Adj R2	.01	.017	.011	.0077	.027	.025
Obs.	366	366	379	379	374	374

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows the ols regression results of workers behaviours in the negotiation over the rounds in sessions with smileys or gendered avatars (a salient female or female employer). Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Accom* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted.

Table A.11: Gender Gaps in Outcomes by Gender Salience in the Negotiation: Workers Negotiating in a Gender-Neutral (Smiley) or Gender Salient (Male or Female Avatars) Session, All Rounds

	Workers Negotiation Outcomes and Gender Salience Across Rounds					
	(1) Success	(2) Success	(3) Exp Earn	(4) Exp Earn	(5) Job Pay	(6) Residual
Female	0.046**	0.071***	2.094	5.408	-4.875***	-4.946**
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(2.310)	(3.363)	(1.519)	(2.278)
Salient Female Emp	0.009	0.036	1.015	5.591	-0.273	0.464
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(2.951)	(4.082)	(1.840)	(2.473)
Salient Male Emp	-0.004	0.017	-2.126	-0.074	-1.795	-2.735
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(3.314)	(4.792)	(1.911)	(2.422)
Sal Fem Round 1	0.018	0.018	0.254	0.292	-2.665	-2.610
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(3.262)	(3.265)	(1.985)	(1.987)
Fem x Sal Male Emp		-0.042		-4.166		1.778
		(0.041)		(5.499)		(2.998)
Fem x Sal Fem Emp		-0.056		-9.215*		-1.512
		(0.039)		(5.205)		(3.203)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.012	.013	.0047	.0064	.04	.041
Adj R2	.0066	.0071	-.0005	.0001	.034	.034
Obs.	1915	1915	1915	1915	1706	1706

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows ols regression results of workers behaviour and outcomes in the negotiation over the rounds in sessions with Smileys or gendered Avatars. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.12: Gender Gaps by Gender Salience in the Negotiation in Round 1: Outcomes of Workers Negotiating in a Gender-Neutral (Smiley) or Gender Salient (Male or Female Avatars) Session

	Workers Negotiation Outcomes and Gender Salience in Round 1					
	(1) Success	(2) Success	(3) Exp Earn	(4) Exp Earn	(5) Job Pay	(6) Residual
Female	0.023	0.049	-1.161	1.803	-5.040**	-5.867
	(0.031)	(0.048)	(4.857)	(7.416)	(2.314)	(3.593)
Salient Female Emp	0.090***	0.126***	10.515**	16.400**	-2.248	-1.704
	(0.030)	(0.043)	(4.850)	(7.156)	(2.749)	(4.190)
Salient Male Emp	-0.045	-0.028	-8.232	-8.005	-2.287	-4.678
	(0.045)	(0.067)	(6.717)	(10.021)	(2.787)	(4.121)
Fem x Sal Male Emp		-0.034		-0.476		4.743
		(0.091)		(13.495)		(5.537)
Fem x Sal Fem Emp		-0.072		-11.678		-1.122
		(0.060)		(9.739)		(5.548)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.038	.04	.028	.03	.027	.03
Adj R2	.017	.014	.007	.0044	.0035	.00022
Obs.	383	383	383	383	340	340

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows ols regression results of workers behaviour and outcomes in the negotiation over the rounds in sessions with Smileys or gendered Avatars. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job and *Residual* is the earnings for the employer conditional on the negotiation being successful.

Table A.13: Gender gaps in Negotiation Behaviours and Outcomes of Workers Negotiating in a Gender Salient condition: Facing a Female Employer versus a Male Employer, All Rounds

	Only Gender Salience: Workers Facing a Male versus a Female Employer					
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 2	Stage 4	End	Job
	Ask 1	Ask 2	Accom	Success	Exp. Earn	Job Pay
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Salient Female Emp	-0.228	0.698	0.029	0.020	5.668	3.274**
	(1.071)	(1.208)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(4.247)	(1.434)
Fem x Sal Male Emp	-10.204***	-5.330**	0.042	0.036	1.793	-3.655*
	(3.783)	(2.347)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(4.423)	(2.053)
Fem x Sal Fem Emp	-8.459**	-6.651***	0.077**	0.022	-3.287	-6.946***
	(3.758)	(2.315)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(3.973)	(2.290)
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.047	.056	.037	.012	.012	.051
Adj R2	.032	.042	.023	-.0028	-.0031	.036
Obs.	913	954	942	960	960	859

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows ols regression results of workers behaviour and outcomes in the negotiation over the rounds in sessions of gender salience. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Accom* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted. *Success* is a dummy variable indicating if the negotiation was successful i.e the Ask 2 was accepted by the employer (=1) or not accepted (=0). *Exp Earn* is the expected earnings of the negotiation and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job.

Table A.14: Fixed Effects Regressions of *Female* Workers Negotiation Behaviours and Outcomes in a Gender Salient Condition: Facing a Salient Male Employer compared to Salient Female Employer, All Rounds, Only Sessions with Salient Gender

	Facing a Female Employer versus a Male Employer					
	(1) Ask 1	(2) Ask 2	(3) Accom	(4) Accepted	(5) Earn	(6) Cond_Earn
Employer Same Gender	0.132	-1.074	0.065***	0.024	3.140	-0.427
	(0.944)	(0.741)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(3.131)	(1.038)
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj R2	.011	.014	.023	-.0013	-.0038	-.0063
Within R2	.021	.024	.034	.0091	.0067	.0053
F-value	3.7	1.7	2.4	.93	.84	.31
p-value	.0025	.13	.03	.48	.55	.93
Rho	.81	.61	.33	.26	.16	.56
Id:s	95	96	96	96	96	96
Obs.	558	573	564	576	576	521

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows fixed effects regression results of female workers behaviour and outcomes in the negotiation over the rounds, comparing changes in negotiation when workers switch to face a male employer from a female employer. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Earn* is the expected earnings and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job.

Table A.15: Fixed Effects Regressions of *Male* Workers Negotiation Behaviours and Outcomes in a Gender Salient Condition: Facing a Salient Male Employer compared to Salient Female Employer, All Rounds, Only Sessions with Salient Gender

	Facing a Male Employer versus a Female Employer					
	(1) Ask 1	(2) Ask 2	(3) Accom	(4) Accepted	(5) Earn	(6) Cond_Earn
Employer Same Gender	-1.084	-0.918	-0.046**	-0.038	-8.760**	-2.424**
	(0.745)	(1.035)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(4.063)	(1.144)
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj R2	.004	.0073	.0033	.0082	.011	.012
Within R2	.015	.018	.014	.019	.022	.024
F-value	2.2	1.9	.96	1.1	1.4	2.3
p-value	.046	.092	.46	.36	.21	.041
Rho	.79	.61	.3	.24	.16	.59
Id:s	93	96	96	96	96	96
Obs.	539	571	566	576	576	510

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows fixed effects regression results of male workers behaviour and outcomes in the negotiation over the rounds, comparing changes in negotiation when workers switch to face a male employer from a female employer. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Offer* is the employer's offer in Stage 2 of the game. *Acc* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, and *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0). *Earn* is the expected earnings and *Job Pay* is the earnings conditional on the negotiation being successful, and the resulting pay that the worker gets for the job.

Table A.16: Regressions of *Male* Negotiation Behaviours of Workers and Employers and Risk-taking, STEM study, Experience, Liking to Negotiate, Relative Economy, All Workers

	Preferences, Math Skills, Relative Economy				
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 2	Stage 4
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Empl*
	Ask1	Ask 2	Accom	Accom	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Salient Female Counterpart	-0.483	-1.181	0.018	0.033	-0.017
	(4.605)	(2.912)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Salient Male Counterpart	-1.673	-2.085	-0.027	-0.022	-0.045
	(4.517)	(3.006)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Startorder: Female in R1	-1.101	-2.259	0.070*	0.018	0.057**
	(5.282)	(3.178)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Age/Experience	0.080	0.247	0.000	0.003*	-0.004
	(0.461)	(0.319)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Stem Studies	-12.370**	-5.845*	0.030	0.055***	0.021
	(5.496)	(3.019)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Risk taker	4.614	-0.788	0.022	-0.034**	-0.015
	(3.728)	(2.428)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Like to negotiate	1.261*	1.227**	-0.011**	0.003	-0.000
	(0.740)	(0.496)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Better Rel Econ.	0.794	0.381	-0.005	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.999)	(0.612)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.047	.046	.032	.049	.013
Adj R2	.033	.032	.017	.035	-.0013
Obs.	1059	1121	1115	1122	1134

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows ols regression results of male workers and employers negotiation behaviours. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Accom* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted. *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0).

Table A.17: Regressions of *Female* Negotiation Behaviours of Workers and Employers and Risk-taking, STEM study, Experience, Liking to Negotiate, Relative Economy, All Workers

	Preferences, Math Skills, Relative Economy				
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 2	Stage 4
	Worker	*Worker*	*Worker*	*Empl*	*Empl*
	Ask1	Ask 2	Accom	Accom	Accept
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Salient Female Counterpart	0.370	0.987	0.045	0.025	0.033
	(4.494)	(2.813)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.026)
Salient Male Counterpart	-0.136	1.880	-0.018	-0.022	0.022
	(4.545)	(2.887)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Startorder: Female in R1	-4.856	-4.397	-0.013	0.018	-0.007
	(5.020)	(3.086)	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Age/Experience	-0.057	0.119	-0.001	0.004***	0.003
	(0.642)	(0.446)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Stem Studies	15.475***	8.613**	-0.101**	-0.011	-0.001
	(5.032)	(3.348)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Risk-taker	8.386**	4.891**	-0.044	0.004	0.010
	(3.718)	(2.282)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Like to negotiate	0.072	0.201	0.005	-0.001	0.005
	(0.741)	(0.459)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Better Rel Econ.	0.124	0.126	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002
	(1.029)	(0.628)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.079	.064	.035	.027	.015
Adj R2	.065	.05	.021	.013	.0011
Obs.	1094	1116	1095	1130	1140

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows ols regression results of female workers and employers negotiation behaviours. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* and *Ask 2* are the worker's first and second asks in Stage 1 and 3, *Accom* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted. *Accept* is a dummy variable indicating if the employer accepted (=1) the last ask or not (=0).

Table A.18: Regressions of the Gender gap in Asking and Accommodating Behaviour when Adding Controls for Preferences

	Workers Ask					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Ask 1	Ask 1	Acc	Acc	Acc	Acc
Female	-8.880***	-8.277***	0.058***	0.056***	0.033***	0.034***
	(2.557)	(2.571)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Rounds	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Preferences	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Startingorder	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	.033	.051	.019	.025	.029	.039
Adj R2	.028	.043	.014	.017	.024	.032
Obs.	2189	2153	2258	2210	2276	2252

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows ols regression results of workers and employers negotiation behaviours. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual player level and are given in parentheses. *Ask 1* is the worker's first ask in Stage 1, *Accom* is the accommodation rate, the adjustment rate to what the counterpart wanted, Stage 2-3.

Table A.19: Summary Statistics of the Negotiation Behaviours in Round 1 for Female and Male Workers

	Scale	(1) All	(2) Male	(3) Female	(4) p-value
Ask 1	0-250	157.03	160.54	153.54	0.03*
		(32.29)	(32.18)	(32.09)	
Ask 2	0-250	142.24	144.76	139.73	0.04*
		(23.95)	(24.81)	(22.86)	
Accommodation	0-2	0.78	0.75	0.81	0.17
		(0.43)	(0.33)	(0.52)	
Exp Earnings	0-250	123.38	124.58	122.18	0.63
		(48.34)	(50.99)	(45.66)	
Job Pay	0-250	121.82	119.65	124.00	0.66
		(47.91)	(54.35)	(40.94)	
N		383	191	192	383

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows the averages of all workers, and for male and female workers separately. Column 4 shows p-values from t-tests gender differences. N denotes the number of participants.

Table A.20: Summary Statistics: Within Gender Gaps in Workers Negotiation Behaviours in Round 1

	Scale	(1) Smiley	(2) Fem Emp	(3) Male Emp	(4) p-value_S-FE	(5) p-value_S_ME	(6) p-value_FE_ME
Female Workers							
Ask 1	0-250	157.69	142.33	156.44	0.01**	0.83	0.03*
		(32.44)	(29.17)	(32.18)			
Ask 2	0-250	139.24	135.73	144.71	0.35	0.19	0.07
		(21.87)	(19.54)	(27.07)			
Accommodation	0-2	0.83	0.90	0.68	0.23	0.15	0.11
		(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.88)			
Exp Earnings	0-250	122.78	128.75	114.40	0.43	0.34	0.12
		(46.38)	(32.66)	(54.31)			
Job Pay	0-250	133.35	130.00	139.69	0.70	0.26	0.20
		(18.13)	(11.73)	(15.00)			
N		96	48	48	144	144	96
Male Workers							
Ask 1	0-250	161.30	160.31	155.94	0.87	0.39	0.53
		(34.35)	(30.16)	(37.48)	(5.84)	(6.26)	(6.94)
Ask 2	0-250	146.57	142.08	145.96	0.32	0.90	0.44
		(27.05)	(21.28)	(27.72)	(4.47)	(4.82)	(5.04)
Accommodation	0-2	0.77	0.82	0.64	0.25	0.04*	0.01**
		(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.40)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Exp Earnings	0-250	122.42	138.54	112.35	0.06	0.32	0.01**
		(56.01)	(29.21)	(57.34)	(8.63)	(9.98)	(9.29)
Job Pay	0-250	142.50	137.06	141.33	0.46	0.93	0.69
		(25.04)	(16.87)	(34.77)	(7.26)	(12.99)	(10.67)
N		96	48	48	144	144	96

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. The table shows the averages of male and female workers separately by gender salience treatment. Column 4 shows p-values from t-tests gender differences. N denotes the number of participants.

Table A.21: Summary Statistics of Player Characteristics

	Scale	(1) Male mean	(2) Female mean	(3) p-value p
Risk-taker (incentivized)	0-1	0.518	0.387	0.000***
		(0.500)	(0.488)	
Q: Risk Preference	1-10	5.432	5.003	0.003**
		(2.020)	(1.999)	
Q: Like Negotiation	1-10	5.716	5.272	0.021*
		(2.747)	(2.572)	
Q: Reservation Wage	1-100	4.204	3.490	0.553
		(17.626)	(15.373)	
Q: Relative Economy	0-10	4.990	4.887	0.467
		(1.963)	(1.921)	
N		384	382	766

NOTES: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01 and ** p< 0.05. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

B Additional Experimental Description

B.1 Risk preferences

We elicit risk preferences from two measures: (i) one from the risk-preference question in the exit survey (see attached instructions), and (ii) one using a lottery choice in which a participant can win money in one of two lotteries. The lottery is either one with a higher chance to win but a lower gain of 6 euros, or one with a lower chance to win but a higher gain of 14 euros. Note that the exact values of the lottery gains may change over the course of the experiment.

B.2 Eliciting gender of player:

To obtain information on participants' gender, the experiment begins with a short questionnaire regarding gender, age, education, and language skills (see questions below). The additional questions are included to mask the significance of asking about gender.

Some introductory questions:

Here we ask you some questions about yourself and your education.

Select your age in years:
[Code: Use drop-down list with year span]

Select your main field of study (select "none" if you are not a student):
[Code: Use drop-down list with educational tracks]

Number of finished years:
◯1 ◯2 ◯3 ◯4 ◯5 ◯5+

Gender:
◯ *Man* ◯ *Woman*

Please tick the languages that you speak apart from Italian and indicate your level of command?

B.3 Exit survey:

The experiment also contains an exit survey. Questions regard preferences for risk and negotiation.

B.4 Show-up fees and Overdrafting

All participants were offered a show-up fee of 10 euros if they completed the session or were over-recruited. The experiment over-recruited (and paid the show-up fee) to around four or five participants of each gender to ensure a fully gender-balanced sample of 24 participants per session.

B.5 Payments and exits

Throughout the experiment, participants were made fully aware of the payment structure and economic incentives. Generally, the average payment of a participant was adjusted so that earnings were

comparable with those from similar experiments run in the laboratory, taking into account the total time required to complete the session. A link explaining how to finalise the payment was provided at the end of the experiment before exiting, and payments were usually administered about a week after participation. The entire experiment lasted approximately two hours.

B.6 Anonymity and personal data recordings

Participants were informed, through a consent form signed prior to participation, about which personal data the laboratory would record and how these data would be linked to their ID number. The consent form also stated that participants could request deletion of their personal records at any time. The signed consents are kept by the laboratory for administrative, tax, and legal reasons. In addition, the laboratory keeps signed payment receipts that include the participant's ID number and the total sum earned in the experiment, but no details about which parts of the experiment generated those earnings. These receipts therefore cannot be used to match participants' identities with their experimental data on choices and performance. The data provided by the laboratory on participants' choices and performance are completely anonymised.